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In developing countries, informal firms (those that are not registered with the government) account
for about half of all economic activity.  We consider three broad views of the role of such firms in
economic development.  According to the romantic view, these firms would become the engine of
economic growth if not stopped by government regulation.  According to the parasite view, informal
firms, by avoiding taxes and regulations, unfairly compete with the more efficient formal firms and,
by taking away their market share, undermine economic progress.  According to the dual view, informal
firms are highly inefficient, do not pose much threat to the formal firms, but also do not contribute
to economic growth, which is driven by the efficient formal firms.
Using data from World Bank firm level surveys, we find that informal firms are small and extremely
unproductive, compared even to the small formal firms, and especially relative to the larger formal
firms.  Compared to the informal firms, formal ones are run by much better educated managers.  As
a consequence, they use more capital, have different customers, market their products, and use more
external finance.  Hardly any formal firms had ever operated informally.  This evidence is inconsistent
with the romantic and parasite views, but supports the dual view.  In this "Walmart" theory of economic
development, growth comes from the creation of the highly productive formal firms.  Informal firms

























of  becoming  and  staying  official  influence  its  size.  This  evidence  is  consistent  with  the  generally 
accepted view that unofficial firms avoid paying taxes and adhering to regulations, but lose the access to 









associate  with  the  work  of  De  Soto  (1989,  2000),  unofficial  firms  are  either  actually  or  potentially 
extremely productive, and are held back by government taxes and regulations, as well as by lack of 
secure property rights and of access to finance.   Pending the necessary legal reforms “four billion 
people  around  the  world  are  robbed  of  the  chance  to  better  their  lives  and  climb  out  of  poverty, 
because they are excluded from the rule of law” (United Nations, 2008, page 1).  If the barriers to 





















“The  high  proportion  of  small  firms  in  service  industries  makes  them  particularly  likely  to  operate 
informally, ignoring tax requirements, employee benefits, and other regulations.  This is a much larger 
barrier to growth than most policymakers in emerging – and developed – economies acknowledged.  






































recently  by  the  World  Bank.   The  first  set  of  surveys,  known  as  Enterprise  Surveys,  covers  small, 

















access  to  public  goods  and  finance.  Extremely  few  of  the  registered  firms  have  ever  operated  as 






















































observable  variables.  The  list  of  candidate  variables  includes  the  incidence  of  micro  and  small 
enterprises, male participation rate in the labor force, the fraction of workers contributing to social 
security,  electricity  consumption,  and  currency  in  circulation.  We  gather  data  on  three  of  such 
indicators. 
 
 The  first  indicator  is  the  percentage  of  the  active  labor  force  that  is  self‐employed.  The 
definition  of  self‐employed  includes  “jobs  where  the  remuneration  is  directly  dependent  upon  the 
profits derived from the goods and services produced” (International Labor Office, 2007) but not unpaid 








































































































poor  countries  –  is  21  percentage  points  higher  in  poor  countries  than  in  rich  ones.  The  self‐




from  the  rich  countries  to  the  poor  ones.  Consistent  with  this  pattern,  the  number  of  registered 

































































most  straightforward  interpretation  of  the  results  in  this  section  is  that  the  informal  economy  is  a 
manifestation  of  underdevelopment.  It  recedes  as  the  economy  develops,  perhaps  because  public 
goods become better and financial markets larger or because avoiding detection becomes harder.    It 
remains  a  crucial,  and  open,  question  whether  this  decline  of  the  informal  sector  results  from  the 
conversion of informal firms to the official status, or from their death and replacement by formal firms.   12 
 

































  In  this  section  we  describe  our  data  and  present  simple  descriptive  statistics.  Our  basic 
approach is to compare country‐by‐country the relative performance of formal and informal firms.  To 



































involves  contacting  the  firms  that  will  be  sampled.  Enterprise  Surveys  use  either  simple  random 
sampling or random stratified sampling.   A local World Bank contractor phones the firms to set up an 
interview with the person who most often deals with banks or government agencies.  At that stage, 
firms  with  fewer  than  5  employees  are  dropped  from  the  sample,  as  are  government‐owned 
establishments, cooperatives, and community‐owned establishments.  Typical final sample sizes range 
between 250 and 1,500 businesses per country.  The core questionnaire is organized in two parts.  The 
first  part  seeks  managers’  opinions  on  the  business  environment.  The  second  part  focuses  on 
productivity measures and is often completed with the help of the chief accountant or human resource 
manager.   
















with  fewer  than  five  employees,  larger  establishments  are  not  dropped  from  the  sample.  In  fact, 
establishments with fewer than five employees account for only 50% of the Micro sample.   
Participation  in  the  surveys  is  voluntary,  and  respondents  are  not  paid  to  participate.
3  














questionnaires.  In  the  Informal  Survey,  we  rely  on  respondent’s  answer  to  whether  firms  are 
“registered with any agency of the central government".  In practical terms, firms are registered with an 
agency of the central government if they have obtained a tax identification number. In the Micro Survey, 
we  rely  on  respondent’s  answer  to  whether  firms  have  either  “registered  with  the  Office  of  the 
Registrar…or other government institutions responsible for commercial registration” or have “obtained 
a  tax  identification  number  from  the  tax  administration  or  other  agency  responsible  for  tax 
registration”.
4    Both  surveys  also  keep  track  of  whether  firms  are  registered  with  “any  local 
government agency” or with any “industry board or agency”.  We focus on registration with the central 
government  because  this form of registration is  more directly relevant  to avoiding taxes, enforcing 

























































statistics  for  the  difference  between  the  means  of  different  groups  of  interest  (e.g.  Small  vs. 







































































(27.1%),  exceeds  that  of  Enterprise  survey  firms  (17.6%).   The  fast  employment  growth  rate  of 

































Likewise,  the  regulatory  burden  increases  rapidly  with  firm  size.  Whereas  managers  of 
unregistered firms in the Informal (Micro) sample report spending 5.6% (1.5%) of their time dealing with 21 
 



























that  Enterprise  Survey  respondents  estimate  losses  as  a  result  of  theft  equal  to  0.54%  of  sales  in 
Germany, 0.26% in Ireland, and 0.22% in Spain.   














29.2%  of  unregistered  and  33.2%  of  registered  firms  in  the  Micro  sample  used  courts  to  resolve 
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not  observe κ s,  relative  productivities  are  unaffected  by  setting κ s  equal  to  1  for  each  industry  s.  
Intuitively, goods sold by very productive firms must command lower prices to induce buyers to demand 
the higher output.  Raising sales to the power σ/ (σ‐1) yields Ysi, making it possible to infer real output 





























































of  them  answer  questions  about  sales,  even  though  they  do  not  have  to.  They  also  give  answers 
































































































































four  dummies  barely  change  as  we  add  industry  controls.  Coefficients  do  change  when  we  add 
expenditure on raw materials. Specifically, the estimated coefficients for each of the four dummies are 
roughly cut in half.  Adding expenditure on energy further lowers the estimated coefficients on the four 
dummies  but  not  significantly  so.  The  four  coefficients  barely  change  as  we  add  expenditure  on 













similar  to  those  for  value  added.  In  the  full  specification,  the  estimated  coefficients  for  both  the 
Informal and the Micro dummies are positive and significant.  The interaction between registered and 



















generator;  (10)  the  firm  uses  email  to  communicate  with  clients;  (11)  the  firm  uses  a  website  to 
communicate  with  clients;  and  (12)  the  firm  has  an  electrical  connection.   Finally,  we  use  five 











percentage  points  if  the  top  manager  has  some  college  education  (rather  than  some  lower  school 
education).  Having a top manager with some college also has large effects on the probability of having a 32 
 







a  modest  8.7  percentage  points  (the  standard  deviation  is  23.3%),  and  capacity  utilization  by  5.5 
percentage points (the standard deviation is 21.4%).  



















  As  a  final  step,  we  present  information  on  obstacles  to  doing  business,  as  reported  by 
respondents in Informal, Micro, and Enterprise surveys.  All obstacles are reported on the 0‐4 scale for 33 
 
their  perceived  significance,  with  0  representing  “no  obstacle”,  1  “minor  obstacle”,  2  “moderate 















































information  about  how  to  register).  Labor  regulation  and  tax  compliance  are  seen  as  much  less 
important.   Here as well, the picture that emerges is one in which the formal firms have better access to 
markets,  services,  and  finance,  and  hence  can  be  much  more  productive,  but  need  to  pay  taxes.    
Presumably,  for  the  Cape  Verde  firms  in  the  Informal  Survey,  the  tax  price  is  too  high  to  justify 
registration.   
The evidence on obstacles further supports the dual theory, and seems rather inconsistent with 





















































































infrastructure,  and  capital  markets  policies,  very  much  along  the  lines  of  traditional  dual  economy 
theories.   From the perspective of economic growth, we should not expect much from the unofficial 
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  % GDP Informal % Tax Evasion % GDP Informal % GDP Informal Registered firms /
(World Economic Forum) (Enterprise survey) (electricity consumption) (multiple indicators) population (000s)
First GDP/POP quartile 429 35.4 29.0 46.4 57.3 38.9 42.3 3.2
Second GDP/POP quartile 1,362 33.7 23.3 35.7 37.1 42.7 39.8 8.2
Third GDP/POP quartile 4,002 27.6 19.7 23.1 24.6 31.3 34.1 28.7
Fourth GDP/POP quartile 20,348 17.3 8.2 13.3 12.5 17.6 18.3 41.8











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs.
Angola 2006 22,524 8 46,153 107 44,509 115 219,543 353 440,131 64 826,909 6 261,533 423
Botswana 2006 27,192 27 105,688 73 84,494 100 1,054,364 212 4,027,974 86 9,497,498 39 2,790,306 337
Burundi 2006 31,950 16 44,336 121 42,889 137 262,566 219 1,313,305 43 2,923,213 8 508,740 270
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2006 20,150 40 32,891 64 27,991 104 156,191 258 779,580 71 1,675,336 11 335,518 340
Gambia, The 2006 12,955 47 20,307 76 17,498 123 191,976 118 975,985 47 3,564,678 7 543,472 172
Guinea 2006 93,345 27 129,568 77 120,164 104 180,759 194 979,018 19 2,246,573 7 315,430 220
Guinea‐Bissau 2006 22,532 29 48,451 108 42,965 137 155,735 97 441,720 16 196,228 113
India 2006 40,179 643 92,382 906 70,713 1,549 391,872 2,839 2,121,049 714 8,301,780 307 1,340,829 3,860
Mauritania 2006 56,070 69 38,977 53 48,644 122 258,159 181 2,287,588 44 8,216,648 5 819,408 230
Namibia 2006 5,392 49 31,419 47 18,134 96 665,167 225 2,917,353 82 9,329,198 17 1,689,759 324
Rwanda 2006 8,295 22 46,821 106 40,199 128 344,204 143 2,071,016 53 7,671,968 16 1,328,946 212
Swaziland 2006 5,658 34 52,230 83 38,696 117 391,593 207 2,418,694 55 6,982,505 32 1,488,191 294
Tanzania 2006 30,093 25 48,327 40 41,314 65 326,825 259 3,430,273 111 16,400,000 44 2,866,305 414
Uganda 2006 43,584 38 93,144 59 73,729 97 361,505 367 1,609,611 149 5,885,212 36 1,058,645 552
Average 29,994 77 59,335 137 50,853 214 354,318 405 1,843,807 111 6,424,732 41 1,110,236 554
Micro Survey









Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs.
Bangladesh 2003 19,794 195 48,856 2 20,089 197 321,193 64 2,360,761 259 8,367,846 642 6,221,918 965
Brazil 2003 32,528 218 51,227 126 39,377 344 767,484 252 3,419,992 811 24,100,000 406 8,683,195 1,469
Cambodia 2003 25,710 209 75,165 6 27,090 215 167,574 193 979,849 40 3,260,287 26 603,488 259
Cape Verde 2006 29,917 85 18,922 18 27,996 103 374,308 69 1,738,857 23 4,149,963 1 752,375 93
Guatemala 2003 16,339 183 23,604 10 16,716 193 460,772 163 1,782,770 131 9,557,032 83 2,922,765 377
India 2002 31,956 419 69,237 30 34,447 449 459,165 749 2,804,990 485 17,200,000 230 3,871,384 1,464
Indonesia 2003 29,237 276 . . 29,237 276 34,244 2 4,608,116 301 41,500,000 337 24,000,000 640
Kenya 2003 20,297 149 30,712 36 22,323 185 1,675,268 49 6,070,552 65 31,800,000 41 11,500,000 155
Niger 2005 15,169 48 14,927 58 15,037 106 4,999,650 34 4,416,983 16 14,700,000 3 5,371,892 53
Pakistan 2003 15,435 210 7,805 3 15,327 213 2,066,015 7 4,316,266 66 9,332,258 33 5,729,247 106
Senegal 2004 24,944 153 29,827 41 25,976 194 433,291 86 4,542,087 90 18,400,000 35 5,169,733 211
Tanzania 2003 9,212 285 19,260 23 9,963 308 278,088 77 3,754,425 62 15,700,000 38 4,796,542 177
Uganda 2003 35,082 91 45,341 23 37,152 114 297,418 107 3,222,021 58 10,700,000 28 2,681,279 193
Average 23,509 194 36,240 31 24,671 223 948,805 142 3,385,975 185 16,059,030 146 6,331,063 474
Small Medium
Enterprise Survey Informal Survey
Big All Registered Unregistered AllUnregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
General Characteristics:




% of firms that are registered with a central government a g e n c y 0 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 1 4 . 9 % .... . 1 0 0 . 0 % . .
% of firms that are registered with a local government a g e n c y3 4 . 0 % 4 7 . 2 % 3 7 . 0 % .... . 1 3 . 2 % . .
% of firms that are registered with an industry board or a g e n c y 7 . 2 % 1 4 . 8 % 8 . 9 % .... . 7 . 6 % . .
% of occupied land that is owned by the firm 52.3% 55.5% 53.9% 59.0% 70.9% 70.8% 67.4% 13.5% 3.2% 6.7% 11.8%
% of occupied buildings that is owned by the firm 45.1% 48.1% 44.9% 60.8% 74.8% 79.3% 71.2% 26.2%
b 3.0% 15.7% 18.4%
b




Average capacity utilization (%) 61.9% 65.8% 62.4% 66.5% 68.0% 71.2% 68.2% 5.8% 3.9% 4.5% 4.7%
% of firms for which the main buyer are large firms 1.2% 13.5% 1.6% 9.2% 17.8% 16.1% 15.1% 13.5%
a 12.3% 8.0%
a 6.9%
Anticompetitive and informal practices a big obstacle (0‐4) 1.74 2.16 1.78 1.74 1.98 2.11 1.97 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.4
Employees


















% of top managers with secondary education 19.3% 20.8% 18.6% 34.8% 19.5% 5.9% 18.1% ‐0.5% 1.4% 15.4%
c ‐28.9%
a
% of top managers with vocational education 9.8% 15.6% 10.4% 10.9% 8.2% 4.6% 9.1% ‐1.3% 5.8% 1.0% ‐6.3%
c





Index of education of average employee 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 ‐0.1 0.1 ‐0.1 0.2
% of employees with primary education 59.0% 50.0% 58.2% 52.3% 51.5% 45.2% 47.9% ‐10.3% ‐9.1% ‐6.8% ‐7.1%
% of employees with secondary education 34.3% 40.2% 34.9% 24.4% 27.7% 33.5% 32.5% ‐2.4% 5.9% ‐9.9% 9.0%




%firms that have ever had a l o a n 2 4 . 9 % 3 5 . 6 % 2 6 . 0 % .... . 1 0 . 7 % . .
% of financing from internal funds 74.9% 71.0% 75.7% 67.8% 56.3% 50.4% 58.2% ‐17.5%
a ‐3.9% ‐7.2% ‐17.4%
b
% of financing from t r a d e 4 . 6 %6 . 2 %4 . 7 %4 . 9 %6 . 2 %7 . 2 %5 . 9 % 1 . 2 % 1 . 7 % 0 . 4 % 2 . 2 %
% of financing from f a m i l y 1 0 . 5 % 9 . 1 %9 . 5 %6 . 3 %6 . 3 %3 . 7 %6 . 6 % ‐2.9% ‐1.4% ‐4.2% ‐2.6%








Annual growth in employees over previous two years 5.2% 7.1% 5.4% 8.1% 11.1% 11.6% 10.0% 4.6%



















  Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
General Characteristics:




% of firms that are registered with a central government a g e n c y 0 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 6 8 . 4 % .... . 1 0 0 . 0 % . .
% of firms that are registered with a local government a g e n c y3 9 . 4 % 8 1 . 1 % 6 8 . 7 % .... . 4 1 . 7 %
a ..
% of firms that are registered with an industry board or a g e n c y 5 . 0 % 3 0 . 7 % 2 0 . 0 % .... . 2 5 . 7 % . .
% of firms located in the owners h o m e 1 7 . 2 % 1 3 . 4 % 1 3 . 8 % .... . ‐3.9% . .
% of firms located in a permanent s t r u c t u r e 7 1 . 4 % 8 0 . 4 % 7 7 . 0 % .... . 9 . 0 % . .
% of occupied land that is owned by the firm 21.7% 20.1% 20.1% 28.4% 54.3% 71.0% 36.2% 16.1%
a ‐1.6% 6.7% 42.7%
a
% of firms forced to move last year because of lack of secure t i t l e 1 1 . 3 % 8 . 8 % 9 . 8 % .... . ‐2.5% . .





% of firms with an electrical c o n n e c t i o n 6 0 . 0 % 7 9 . 2 % 7 3 . 6 % .... . 1 9 . 2 %
c ..
% uses own transportation e q u i p m e n t 6 . 6 % 2 2 . 9 % 1 8 . 2 % .... . 1 6 . 3 %
a ..
Hours per week that the firm operates 64.8 64.6 64.9 59.4 60.9 79.8 62.2 ‐2.7 ‐0.2 ‐5.4 20.4
a
% of firms for which the main buyer are large firms 0.4% 2.6% 1.8% 21.1% 36.1% 44.7% 29.0% 27.2% 2.2%
a 20.7% 23.6%







































% of top managers with secondary education 27.8% 26.2% 26.2% 25.3% 0.1 5.5% 21.6% ‐4.6% ‐1.7% ‐2.6% ‐19.8%
a
% of top managers with vocational education 10.2% 13.4% 12.4% 17.0% 0.1 6.9% 15.7% 3.3% 3.2% 6.8%
b ‐10.1%
a





Index of education of average employee 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.5 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3
b
% of employees with primary education 48.7% 46.1% 46.4% 47.8% 0.4 31.2% 44.8% ‐1.6% ‐2.7% ‐0.9% ‐16.5%
b
% of employees with secondary education 40.2% 41.2% 41.3% 42.9% 0.5 52.8% 45.8% 4.5% 1.0% 2.7% 9.9%
% of employees with college education 4.0% 5.7% 5.3% 9.3% 0.1 16.0% 9.4% 4.1% 1.7% 5.3% 6.6%
Finance
%firms that have ever had a l o a n 7 . 3 % 1 2 . 5 % 1 0 . 9 % .... . 5 . 1 %
b ..




% of financing from trade 8.3% 11.5% 10.6% 13.3% 17.3% 16.5% 14.2% 3.6% 3.3% 5.0%
c 3.2%
% of financing from family 6.6% 6.7% 6.2% 4.6% 3.1% 0.9% 4.1% ‐2.1% 0.1% ‐2.0% ‐3.7%
a




















































1 129 17.9 17.9
2 134 18.6 36.5
3 79 11.0 47.5
4 52 7.2 54.7
5 58 8.1 62.8
6 26 3.6 66.4
7 28 3.9 70.3
8 19 2.6 72.9
9 22 3.1 76.0







Argentina 1,051 92.8% 1.1% 28.6
Bolivia 609 85.7% 0.7% 21.8
Chile 1,007 98.0% 1.0% 26.6
Colombia 995 89.0% 0.5% 17.0
Ecuador 652 91.6% 0.9% 21.3
El Salvador 683 77.7% 1.4% 21.4
Guatemala 511 90.4% 2.1% 20.9
Honduras 424 89.4% 2.8% 20.5
Mexico 1,439 94.9% 2.8% 18.5
Nicaragua 474 80.4% 0.8% 22.9
Panama 601 97.8% 0.5% 24.5
Paraguay 608 94.4% 0.8% 21.3
Peru 630 96.8% 0.3% 19.8
Uruguay 607 97.5% 2.3% 28.8

















  Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Compliance with government regulations








% of sales a "typical" firm pays in informal gifts or payments to get things done 3.6% 4.8% 3.9% 4.6% 4.1% 3.8% 4.6% 0.7% 1.1% 1.0% ‐0.8%
Public goods
Days last year with power outages 50.0 56.3 50.6 44.9 52.1 53.5 48.0 ‐2.6 6.3 ‐5.0 8.6
Days last year with water outages 33.6 31.3 34.3 22.5 24.4 24.2 23.5 ‐10.8 ‐2.4 ‐11.1 1.6
Days last year with telephone outages 4.1 19.3 14.2 13.1 10.6 11.8 11.7 ‐2.5 15.2 9.0 ‐1.3
Days last year with transportation outages 33.6 22.0 32.7 7.1 9.2 10.9 9.1 ‐23.6 ‐11.6 ‐26.5 3.8
Property rights
% of sales lost last year owing to t h e f t 2 . 9 %3 . 5 %3 . 1 %3 . 8 %1 . 7 %0 . 8 %2 . 2 % ‐0.9% 0.6% 0.9% ‐3.0%
% of sales spent on security expenses 1.8% 1.2% 1.6% 2.2% 2.3% 2.5% 2.3% 0.6% ‐0.6% 0.4% 0.3%
% of sales spent on "protection p a y m e n t s " 1 . 0 %0 . 5 %1 . 0 %0 . 5 %0 . 8 %0 . 7 %0 . 7 % ‐0.3% ‐0.5% ‐0.5% 0.3%
% of incidents reported to the police 14.1% 26.2% 19.1% 36.0% 38.0% 54.0% 42.6% 23.5%
b 12.1% 21.9%
b 18.1%
% of firms that had payment dispute in last 2 y e a r s 2 1 . 5 % 0 . 0 % 2 1 . 3 % .... . ‐21.5% . .











Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Compliance with government regulations









% of sales a "typical" firm pays in informal gifts or payments to get things done 4.0% 3.5% 3.3% 6.6% 7.1% 5.6% 6.6% 3.2%
a ‐0.5% 2.6% ‐1.0%
Public goods
Number of power outages in the last year 167.1 134.4 138.8 138.3 151.7 157.9 143.7 4.9 ‐32.7 ‐28.8 19.6
Days last year with water outages . . . 57.9 56.4 51.8 51.9 . . . ‐6.1
Days last year with telephone outages . . . 3.7 4.8 3.5 4.0 . . . ‐0.2
Property rights
% of sales lost last year owing to theft 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 2.6% 1.8% 1.6% 2.4% 1.8%
a 0.0% 2.1%
a ‐1.0%
% of sales spent on security expenses 3.4% 2.8% 2.9% 2.3% 2.1% 1.2% 2.1% ‐0.8%
c ‐0.6% ‐1.1% ‐1.1%
a
% of sales spent on "protection payments" . . . 0.4% 2.9% 0.2% 1.2% . . . ‐0.1%
% of firms that had payment dispute in last 2 years 6.0% 8.4% 7.5% 9.5% 16.6% 19.4% 11.4% 4.0%
c 2.3% 3.5% 9.9%
a

























































Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Expenditure on raw materials / Sales (%) 30.5% 35.2% 31.0% 43.2% 47.2% 41.3% 46.4% 15.4%
a 4.7% 12.7%
b ‐1.9%
Expenditure on energy / Sales (%) 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Expenditure on labor / Sales (%) 13.4% 21.8% 14.9% 21.5% 17.8% 17.3% 18.9% 4.0% 8.4% 8.1% ‐4.2%
c
Expenditure on machines / Sales (%) 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Expenditure on land / Sales (%) 8.3% 13.2% 10.4% 4.2% 1.6% 2.0% 3.6% ‐6.8% 4.9% ‐4.1% ‐2.2%














Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Expenditure on raw materials / Sales (%) 38.5% 39.7% 39.6% 41.3% 44.4% 49.3% 42.6% 3.0% 1.2% 2.7% 8.0%
Expenditure on energy / Sales (%) 3.6% 2.9% 2.9% 4.2% 3.8% 4.6% 4.1% 1.2%
c ‐0.7% 0.6% 0.4%
Expenditure on labor / Sales (%) 23.3% 21.0% 21.5% 21.6% 19.7% 17.7% 20.9% ‐0.5% ‐2.3% ‐1.7% ‐3.9%
c
Expenditure on machines / Sales (%) 2.9% 3.3% 3.1% 17.8% 44.1% 32.9% 18.6% 15.5% 0.4% 14.8% 15.1%
Expenditure on land / Sales (%) . . . 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% . . . 0.0%
Expenditure on rent / Sales ( % ) 7 . 4 %8 . 3 %8 . 0 %6 . 7 %3 . 5 %2 . 3 %5 . 8 % ‐2.2%
c 0.9% ‐0.6% ‐4.4%
a








Micro Survey Enterprise Survey DifferencesYear Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All

























Guinea‐Bissau 2006 6.11 7.21 6.97 9.64 6.92 . 9.25 2.29
b 1.10 3.53
c .




Mauritania 2006 2.12 2.10 2.11 3.88 3.98 4.33 3.91 1.80
a ‐0.02 1.76
a 0.44




Rwanda 2006 1.29 1.52 1.47 4.01 5.70 3.12 4.36 2.89
a 0.23 2.72
a ‐0.89








Uganda 2006 3.08 3.93 3.60 4.32 4.90 3.91 4.45 0.85
b 0.85 1.24
b ‐0.42


































Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All










Informal Survey Enterprise Survey DifferencesCountry Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Bangladesh 2003 7.09 7.92 7.10 7.96 8.53 8.69 8.61 0.83 0.87
b 0.73 1.60
a





Cambodia 2003 7.19 8.01 7.22 . . . . 0.82 . . .
Cape Verde 2006 8.12 7.85 8.07 8.47 9.21 9.78 8.78 ‐0.27 0.35 1.30 1.65









Indonesia 2003 7.73 . 7.73 8.53 8.39 9.16 8.80 . 0.80 0.64 1.44
a




Niger 2005 9.32 7.16 8.24 11.44 10.01 9.98 10.83 ‐2.16 2.12 ‐1.46 0.66
Pakistan 2003 7.21 6.59 7.20 9.78 9.76 9.18 9.58 ‐0.62 2.58
a ‐0.60 1.98
a




Tanzania 2003 6.23 . 6.23 8.65 9.51 9.83 9.40 . 2.43
a 1.18 3.61
a


















Country Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All













Cape Verde 2006 8.35 8.33 8.34 9.82 10.35 9.94 9.96 ‐0.02 1.48
a 0.12 1.60









Indonesia 2003 8.38 . 8.38 7.66 9.07 10.04 9.58 . ‐0.72 2.38
b 1.66
a
Kenya 2003 8.11 8.34 8.15 10.76 11.07 10.98 10.95 0.24 2.65
a 0.22 2.87
a




Pakistan 2003 7.73 7.30 7.73 10.73 10.83 10.17 10.62 ‐0.44 2.99
a ‐0.56 2.43
a























































Country Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All















Cape Verde 2006 13.02 13.09 13.03 15.87 17.28 17.66 16.24 0.06 2.84
a 1.80 4.64









Indonesia 2003 13.32 . 13.32 12.69 15.42 18.25 16.90 . ‐0.62 5.55
a 4.93
a




Niger 2005 12.27 12.01 12.13 18.31 18.10 19.16 18.29 ‐0.26 6.03
a 0.85 6.88
a
Pakistan 2003 12.38 11.63 12.37 17.26 18.08 18.08 18.03 ‐0.75 4.88
a 0.82 5.70
a

























UnregisteredCountry Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All




Botswana 2006 9.00 8.85 8.88 9.49 10.02 9.52 9.66 ‐0.15 0.48 0.03 0.51
Burundi 2006 8.52 7.81 7.91 8.19 9.23 9.11 8.47 ‐0.72 ‐0.33 0.92
b 0.59












Guinea‐Bissau 2006 7.78 8.39 8.31 8.28 8.47 . 8.32 0.61 0.50 . .














Rwanda 2006 7.51 8.38 8.32 9.15 9.36 9.10 9.21 0.86 1.64
a ‐0.05 1.59
c

























Country Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All








Burundi 2006 9.09 8.69 8.73 9.25 9.86 10.15 9.37 ‐0.40 0.16 0.91
b 1.06
b










Guinea 2006 8.88 9.53 9.36 8.92 9.18 9.90 8.98 0.66
b 0.05 0.98
b 1.03
Guinea‐Bissau 2006 8.49 9.05 8.93 9.27 9.35 . 9.28 0.57
c 0.79
a ..































































Country Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All










Burundi 2006 14.20 13.67 13.73 14.96 16.58 17.71 15.30 ‐0.53 0.75 2.76
a 3.51
b














Guinea‐Bissau 2006 13.23 14.01 13.84 15.01 15.78 . 15.12 0.78
c 1.78
a ..






































































































































































































Observations 8,478 8,478 8,478 8,478 8,478 8,478 8,478 8,478
Adjusted R










































































































































Observations 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564
Adjusted R






























































































































































           
0.8749a 
(0.0505)

















Observations 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564 8,564
Adjusted R






































































































































































































































  Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Obstacles (Scale from 0 to 4)
Electricity  1.96 1.99 1.98 2.24 2.43 2.69 2.30 0.32 0.03 0.27 0.45
Tax rates  1.35 1.69 1.59 1.75 1.90 1.84 1.78 0.19 0.34 0.40
c 0.09
Access to financing  2.40 2.33 2.37 2.02 1.91 1.73 1.98 ‐0.39
b ‐0.06 ‐0.37 ‐0.29




Macro‐economic instability (inflation, exchange rate)  1.38 1.67 1.63 1.47 1.51 1.53 1.50 ‐0.14 0.28 0.09 0.06
Tax administration  0.94 1.20 1.13 1.23 1.41 1.48 1.28 0.15 0.26 0.30
c 0.25
Anti‐competitive or unfair practices by other businesses  1.54 1.43 1.47 1.40 1.46 1.48 1.41 ‐0.06 ‐0.12 ‐0.14 0.08
Transportation (road quality, road blocks, finding ways to transport)  1.34 1.30 1.31 1.23 1.25 1.40 1.25 ‐0.06 ‐0.04 ‐0.11 0.18
Corruption  1.09 1.06 1.07 1.20 1.46 1.37 1.27 0.20 ‐0.02 0.11 0.17
Crime, theft and disorder  1.18 1.12 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.32 1.20 0.02 ‐0.06 0.01 0.14




Cost of financing  . . . 0.99 1.02 1.12 1.01 . . . 0.14
Procedures to register firms, formalities, patents, licences, etc. 1.22 1.11 1.10 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.01 ‐0.09 ‐0.12 ‐0.23 0.01




Legal system, conflict resolution  0.38 0.44 0.43 0.55 0.68 0.98 0.60 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.43
a
Economic policy uncertainty  0.88 0.92 0.96 1.02 1.11 0.96 1.05 0.08 0.04 0.14 ‐0.05
Access to land  1.44 1.14 1.22 1.06 0.90 0.89 1.02 ‐0.20
c ‐0.29 ‐0.38
b ‐0.17

















Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Obstacles (Scale from 0 to 4)
Access to or availability of markets  2.05 2.38 2.07 . . . . . 0.33 . .
Tax rates  1.59 2.14 1.65 2.13 2.33 2.50 2.33 0.68
b 0.55 0.54 0.37




Cost of financing  2.19 2.37 2.25 1.99 2.25 2.30 2.20 ‐0.05 0.17 ‐0.20 0.31
Corruption  1.53 1.93 1.59 2.06 2.28 2.27 2.17 0.57
b 0.40 0.53 0.21
Macro‐economic instability (inflation, exchange rate)  1.75 1.98 1.80 1.89 2.05 2.13 1.95 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.23
Electricity  1.74 1.70 1.74 1.85 1.94 2.12 1.92 0.18 ‐0.04 0.11 0.27
Anti‐competitive or unfair practices by other businesses  1.74 2.16 1.78 1.74 1.98 2.11 1.94 0.16 0.42
c 0.00 0.37
Economic policy uncertainty  1.72 1.96 1.75 2.08 2.20 2.10 2.07 0.33 0.24 0.36 0.02
Customs and trade regulations  1.00 1.51 1.06 1.24 1.61 2.09 1.53 0.46
b 0.51 0.25 0.85
a
Access to financing  2.29 2.46 2.32 1.95 1.92 1.83 1.83 ‐0.49
b 0.17 ‐0.33 ‐0.12
Legal system, conflict resolution  1.04 1.33 1.07 1.10 1.47 1.78 1.24 0.17 0.29 0.06 0.67
b
Labor regulations  0.84 1.20 0.91 0.99 1.27 1.75 1.17 0.26 0.36 0.15 0.76
a
Crime, theft and disorder  1.48 1.61 1.49 1.59 1.76 1.71 1.57 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.12
Skills and education of available workers  1.15 1.46 1.23 1.15 1.44 1.67 1.30 0.07 0.31 ‐0.01 0.52
a
Transportation (road quality, road blocks, finding ways to transport)  1.37 1.47 1.36 1.16 1.38 1.57 1.33 ‐0.04 0.11 ‐0.20 0.41
b
Procedures to register firms, formalities, patents, licences, etc. 1.26 1.64 1.49 1.20 1.21 1.42 1.12 ‐0.37 0.37 ‐0.06 0.23
Telephone, fax, e‐mail  1.00 0.84 0.99 0.85 0.94 1.32 0.99 0.00 ‐0.16 ‐0.15 0.47
b
Access to land  1.46 1.70 1.48 0.98 1.05 1.27 0.95 ‐0.53
b 0.24 ‐0.47
c 0.28




















































































































































































































































































































































































































c ‐0.06 0.15 0.00 0.20
c
Hiring index 0.32














Nonwage costs ‐0.10 ‐0.16 ‐0.26




































a ‐0.03 ‐0.12 ‐0.15
c ‐0.13 ‐0.26
c 0.29
a
Corruption ‐0.84
a ‐0.32
a ‐0.67
a ‐0.58
a ‐0.71
a 0.48
a ‐0.57
a ‐0.23
a ‐0.43
a ‐0.26
c ‐0.23
a ‐0.21
a 0.08 ‐0.37
a 0.76
a 0.29
a
Rule of law ‐0.85
a ‐0.29
a ‐0.68
a ‐0.58
a ‐0.72
a 0.49
a ‐0.59
a ‐0.26
a ‐0.44
a ‐0.29
a ‐0.25
a ‐0.25
a 0.08 ‐0.39
a 0.76
a 0.31
a 0.96
a
Private Credit/GDP ‐0.67
a ‐0.28
a ‐0.49
a ‐0.38
a ‐0.60
a 0.43
a ‐0.43
a ‐0.18
c ‐0.31
a ‐0.25
c ‐0.26
a ‐0.21
a ‐0.03 ‐0.39
a 0.61
a 0.27
a 0.74
a 0.75
a
Market Cap/GDP ‐0.54
a ‐0.16 ‐0.39
a ‐0.37
a ‐0.51
a 0.21
c ‐0.38
a ‐0.09 ‐0.36
a ‐0.19 ‐0.24
c ‐0.17
c ‐0.08 ‐0.51
a 0.52
a 0.46
a 0.62
a 0.59
a 0.71
a
Ln(GDP/POP) ‐0.77
a ‐0.34
a ‐0.77
a ‐0.66
a ‐0.66
a 0.52
a ‐0.45
a ‐0.27
a ‐0.30
a ‐0.13 ‐0.25
a ‐0.22
a 0.21
a ‐0.22
b 0.73
a 0.27
a 0.83
a 0.84
a 0.70
a 0.52
a
Appendix – Correlation Table 
The table presents the correlations among the main variables in the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
a significant at the 1% level. 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 10% level. 